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Introduction 
In 2008 I suggested that the concept moral panic was, in many respects, past its sell-by 
date (Waiton 2008). Instead the idea of amoral panic was suggested as an alternative. 
Some of the key aspects of amoral as opposed to moral panics are: 
 the declining use of morality as a framework for panics.  
 the growing importance of amoral categories like ‘risk’ and ‘safety’ as central tenets 
of panics.  
 the engagement with individuals as diminished subjects. 
 old ‘moral’ institutions are undermined rather than shored up by these panics. 
 ‘panics’ are normalised and institutionalised. 
Here I look at the transformation of The Family, an institution once notoriously 
associated with moral panics, something that was associated with moral values and 
understood and defended as something that was ‘at the heart of society’ (Goode and Ben-
Yehuda 1994: 8). The question is raised, to what extent is the ‘future of the nuclear 
family’ the basis for panics today? (Cohen 2011: xxii). In particular, I look at the way the 
idea of the ‘autonomous family’ has all but disappeared, within government and policy 
discussions of the family, and conclude by suggesting we need to see the rise and rise of 
‘early intervention’ policies and initiatives as an illustration of the amoral panic that has 
developed around the family in the twenty-first century.i  
The rise and rise of ‘early intervention’ 
In the government document Next Stop for Early Learning and Child Care published in 
2009, the opening sentence reads, ‘everyone agrees that the first few months and years are 
the most important in a child’s life’. The document goes on to explain that it is a child’s 
mother and father than brings up a child – not governments, but then adds ‘but parents 
need support’ (2009: 3). This is just one of a plethora of documents that have been 
produced in recent years exploring the issue of intervention, early intervention and 
‘support’ for families.ii  
This list of documents is further supported by various reports looking specifically at the 
issue of early intervention, one of the most noticeable being Early Intervention: Good 
Parents, Great Kids, Better Citizens (2008), written jointly by the Labour MP Graham 
Allen and the Conservative MP Iain Duncan Smith. This report emphasises the 
importance of early intervention for many of the key social policy areas in the UK. It 
consequently proposes a significant increase in the need to fund early intervention 
initiative. Over the last decade billions of pounds have been spent on programmes 
connected with early intervention, most particularly with the development of Sure Start 
Centres (Stewart 2013). Strongly influenced by claims about neuroscience and the 
development of the infant’s brain, early intervention was a central social policy in the 
USA in the 1990s, a decade that George Bush proclaimed was to be the ‘decade of the 
brain’ (Wastell and White 2012: 402). In the UK, as we moved into the new millennium 
Tony Blair explained that if he had an extra billion pounds to spend, he would spend it on 
the under-fives (Parton 2006: 97).  
At the level of political rhetoric (and the lack of political dissent), government policy 
developments, funding of social policy initiatives, and arguably also in terms of 
engagement and enthusiasm amongst child care professionals, early intervention has 
become of major significance in the UK (as it has in the USA).  
The autonomous family  
The idea expressed in Next Stop for Early Learning and Child Care that ‘parents need 
support’ has become increasingly expressed in government policy documents. For 
example, launching Every Parent Matters in 2007, the education secretary Alan Johnson 
set out the ‘vital role of parents in improving their child’s life chances’, but also noted, 
‘Traditionally, parenting has been a “no-go” area for governments. But now more than 
ever government needs to be supportive of parents who are themselves increasingly 
seeking help’.iii  
Intervention in the family and to prop up the family is not new (Donzelot 1977, Cullan 
1996). However, for much of the last two centuries there has been a greater hesitancy 
about intervening in a unit or indeed an ‘institution’ that was seen as being at the ‘heart of 
society’. For the establishment, the family was understood to be both a conservative body, 
a moral rein upon degeneracy, and against militancy (Philips 1988). It was also seen as an 
important unit for developing a sense of personal responsibility and ‘self-government’, a 
liberal, Millsian ‘castle’ (Mills 1999): As such the idea of intervening in the family was 
(until recently) seen as problematic.  
Looking at the discussion about the family in the nineteenth century one gets a profound 
sense of how important the ideal of the autonomous (‘bourgeois’) family was. At a time 
when classical liberalism flourished, the family was seen as both an ideal and 
embodiment of the bourgeois value of independence. As the Bergers note, this family was 
protestant in nature, based on the socialisation of highly autonomous individuals, 
rejecting tradition it saw action and belief as being self-generating, constructed internally 
by the self-piloting individual and based upon a morality of hard work, diligence, 
attention to detail, frugality and the systematic development of will power (Berger and 
Berger 1983: 110). 
The development of strength of character was essential. The question was how can this 
character be formed? The answer was simple. To have strong characters you needed 
strong families. And to have strong independent individuals you needed the independent, 
private family. 
The ideal of moral independence faced constant difficulties in the Victorian period with 
regards to the poor, with the contradictory need to support those in desperate need while 
maintaining personal responsibility. There was also an elitist suspicion, by some at least, 
that certain sections of society lacked the capacity to develop their moral independence, 
however this remained a contested area one often reflecting the elites own belief or 
disbelief, in the liberal project of the time (Jordon 1974: 25). However, in general, 
policies were developed with a keen interest in preserving the autonomy of families. Even 
where charity was given to families it was largely done so only if it could be seen to be 
improving rather than undermining the moral independence of those involved. In contrast 
to family policy developments today, it was the development of the ‘character’ and ‘self-
reliance’ of parents that was seen as key, rather than the development of parenting itself 
(Jordon 1974: 26). 
The end of autonomy 
Discussing modern day panics in Britain and America, Joel Best argued that, ‘by the turn 
of the millennium, it was hard to identify many successful social problems campaigns 
mounted in either country solely by conservative claimsmakers’ (Waiton 2008: x). This 
change can be seen with reference to the family, or with what we now discuss as 
‘families’. As gay marriage becomes not only legalised but promoted by the Conservative 
Prime Minister and Major of London it is clear that traditional morality is not the force it 
once was. In both politics and social policy we find little sense of an ‘institution’ being 
defended, and talk of The Family has largely been replaced by the concern about 
‘parenting’. However, as Furedi notes, the decline of traditional morality associated with 
the family has not meant a decline in moralising and anxiety about families. Indeed the 
reverse appears to have happened, with ‘virtually every social problem’ becoming 
associated with poor parenting. Added to this, the inflated importance given to parenting 
(or parental determinism) as the cause and solution to social problems, has resulted in ‘all 
parents’ being seen as potential problems (Furedi 2014: ix). 
This growing problematisation and professionalization of parenting has come, Reece 
argues, with what Furedi (1997) and Heartfield (2002) have described as the diminishing 
of subjectivity. Helen Reece examining family law defines the modern framework for 
legal developments within the family as ‘post-liberal’. Here she notes that not only has 
the conservative moral framework surrounding the family declined but so too has the 
liberal sense of autonomy, privacy and responsibility that was the founding essence of the 
ideal ‘bourgeois’ family. 
In her various studies of the post-liberal subject Helen Reece illustrates the way the 
liberal subject is now conceptualised and critiqued in key political and social theories. In 
Divorcing Responsibly (2003), for example, Reece explores a variety of influential 
thinkers who have challenged the idea of the liberal subject, from Anthony Giddens to 
Catherine McKinnon, Charles Taylor and Amitai Etzioni.  Rather than there being such a 
thing as individuals with free will, subjectivity is understood within these theories to be 
socially constructed, not simply in terms of individuals being merely influenced by other 
people and events, but to our very core and sense of self, we are, these theorists argue, the 
product of external forces and relationships. The problem they have is that taken to its 
logical conclusion this understanding of the subject means that the individual self or agent 
disappears, as does the idea that we can be responsible, as individuals, for anything. To 
resolve this extreme representation of the totally passive individual, Reece argues, the 
idea of the post-liberal subject has emerged. This post-liberal person is neither a subject-
less being, but nor is he or she an autonomous agent either. Rather this new subject is one 
that is constantly developing through continuous interactions and reflection – especially 
in the personal realm (Reece 2003: 13-39). 
Rather than (conservative) morality and the liberal subject governing relationships in UK 
family policies, Reece argues, we now have the post-liberal approach, one that draws 
back from the idea that individuals are simply responsible for their own actions and 
instead understands that we are inter-subjects, subjects constantly constituted through our 
interactions with others, and consequently, individuals who need to have conversations 
with one another. Crucially though, these conversation are not simply between 
individuals but are to be encouraged, supported and facilitated by (often therapeutic) 
experts. 
Reece sees the 1982 Law Commission Report on Illegitimacy as an important milestone 
when, as the report argued, ‘the concept of parental rights, in the sense of conferring on 
the parent control over the person…reflects an outdated view of family life which has no 
part to play in a modern system of law’ (Reece 2006: 463). Through the 1980s this 
understanding became more significant, with the idea of children’s rights and welfare 
seen as being increasingly significant in law, while the notion of parental authority or 
family autonomy dwindled. In the 1991 Criminal Justice Act we had an interesting 
development, where for the first time parents were held directly responsible for their 
children’s crimes rather than financially liable for the crimes of the children. Essentially, 
parents were here being held individually responsible for something that they could not 
necessarily control, while at the same time having their position of 
responsibility/authority within the home diluted. 
The idea of parental responsibility in 1990, Reece believes still had some meaning in 
terms of parental authority, embodying ideas of freedom of parents from government. But 
as case law developed and new practices emerged amongst professionals and experts, the 
idea of parental authority was whittled away, while the ideas of parental rights and 
responsibility similarly declined or came to mean something very different. 
Parenting was reconceptualised as something that was not governed by moral codes of 
right and wrong but was essentially a process governed by compassion, openness and 
emotional literacy. The responsible post-liberal subject ‘is judged not by what he or she 
does but by how he or she approaches his or her actions’ (Reece 2003: 209). There was 
no longer a right way to parent, rather good parenting became an attitude, most 
significantly, this attitude was predicated upon ‘being prepared to learn’ (Reece 2006: 
470). Rather than the family being, in many respect, a private unit with its own authority, 
it became a place where responsible behaviour was expected and legally demanded, 
backed up by an expectation of learning parents opening up and illustrating that they had 
the ‘right attitude’. 
The right attitude of this post-liberal parent is to ask for advice. Seeking advice, as the 
Supporting Families document explains, is responsible behaviour. In other words, the 
‘moral agent has become someone who accepts that he or she needs lessons in how to 
approach moral dilemmas’ (Reece 2003: 154) Indeed a moral agent or unit (like the 
‘autonomous family’) who believes that they do not need expert instruction has become 
problematic: A fiction, in the eyes of post-liberal thinkers, a delusion of grandeur that acts 
as a barrier to necessary support that professionals can bring.  
Amoral Anxiety 
As the morally autonomous family declines as an ideal, and as something that is expected 
or indeed desired, anxiety has grown about the need to support ‘post-liberal’ parents ever 
earlier with their parenting. Indeed in Scotland new legislation has been passed giving 
every child a state ‘named person’ to over-see their interests, from birth.iv Often framed 
within a ‘liberal’ desire to support parents, the early intervention framework is predicated 
upon a diminished sense of parental capacity. Consequently, despite focus, in practice, 
often remaining on poorer families, the trend is for the ‘panic’ or anxiety about parenting 
to be generalised – or normalised – and for state institutions to construct policy around 
this diminished, post-liberal subject. 
Early intervention policies and initiatives have also emerged within a context where 
concerns about ‘risk’ and ‘risk focused prevention’ have become influential (Farrington 
2002). Here anxieties about parents and families are expressed not through the language 
of morality, but ‘through the language or health, science and risk’ (Furedi 2011: 96), or 
‘discourses of ‘risk’ and ‘harm’’ (Hunt 2003: 166). As Lee notes, unable to develop a 
coherent moral ideal or sense of purpose, the authorities have adopted an approach aimed 
at ‘reducing and managing risk’: The aim of moral improvement or the ideal of moral 
responsibility, is here replaced by the ersatz value or norm of ‘keeping us safe’ from harm 
(Lee et al 2014: 14).   
The ‘scientific’ basis for early intervention is provided by the use (and abuse) of 
neuroscience. Despite growing criticism of the illegitimate use of this science, early 
intervention as a core policy objective continues to grow in significance (Bruer 1999, 
Wastell and White 2012, Gillies 2013). Where part and parcel of the Victorian moral 
movements or indeed the liberal approach by individual’s like John Stuart Mill, was to 
challenge and develop the beliefs of adults in society, today, early interventionists are 
preoccupied merely with our behaviour: Then the concern was with the human mind 
today our interventions are reduced to concerns about the biological brain (Tallis 2012).v 
Within this modern day determinism, not a million miles away from the craniology of the 
nineteenth century, the understanding of humanity, of childhood, families, 
neighbourhoods and even society itself is reduced to an analysis of neurons.  
Conclusion  
The enthusiasm for early intervention can appear as a new form of dynamism in society, a 
new sense of purpose amongst professionals and a new framework for meaning and the 
development of grand projects. However, predicated upon the idea that if we do not 
intervene in a child’s life (who has had some difficulties), before the age of three, then it 
is too late, early intervention is better understood as the outcome of a collapse of belief. 
Biological determinism was influential in the nineteenth century (Lombroso 2009), but at 
the same time there were competing ideas and beliefs about how to transform individuals 
and society. Belief in religion, or the liberal individual, or indeed of the possibility of 
socialism all embodies a sense of human capacity, of moral or social advancement. 
Similarly, with the development of the state in the twentieth century there has been at 
different times a passion for education, for social and youth work, or even for prisons, as 
institutions that could uplift young people and even rehabilitate adults. Today, through the 
prism of early intervention and the ‘myth’ of the first three years (Breur 1999) all of these 
forms of political, moral, individual or collective improvement are lost.  
The early years framework has serious implications for the understanding of individuals 
and their capacity to overcome difficulties. As well as reflecting a diminished sense of the 
capacity for institutions, elites and beliefs to have an impact on children over the age of 
three, it also suggests that individuals themselves lack the capacity to change and to 
develop as they grow. The diminished post-liberal self is discovered in the early years 
interventionists who are convinced, especially with the help of brain science that after a 
‘bad’ first few years of life the individual is doomed to a life of antisocial behaviour 
(Allen and Smith 2008). 
This panic about young children and their families, expressed through a scientific and risk 
based framework of early intervention, in many respects, is built upon an opposition to or 
at least a sense of unease about old fashioned traditional family values: Values that can be 
seen as extreme, dogmatic, rigid, authoritarian, and in terms of the therapeutic idea of 
‘well-being’,vi potentially abusive. It likewise reacts to the ideal of autonomy and the 
independence of the family – a problematic place and space that takes place ‘behind 
closed doors’ and away from the ever growing importance of professional ‘support’ and 
intervention. 
Today the family is less an institution around which moral panics can be located, than a 
new site for amoral elite anxieties to be expressed and the diminished subject to be kept 
safe. 
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